Now You See It: Waetzig v. Halliburton and the Lawsuit That Wouldn’t Stay Gone

A magician’s fake thumb hides an object. The audience believes it’s vanished, but it’s still there, waiting. A voluntary dismissal works the same way—for a while. The lawsuit disappears from the docket. The defendant relaxes. The case is gone.

Until it isn’t.

In Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 604 U.S. ___ (2025), the Supreme Court answered a deceptively simple question: Can a plaintiff undo their own voluntary dismissal?

The answer: Yes—if the court allows it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

Inspect the Magician’s Prop: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure – Rule 60(b)

(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding.  On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

The Pledge: A Lawsuit That Disappeared, for a While

Gary Waetzig sued Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. §621 et seq.). Before the case could progress, he voluntarily dismissed it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) to take the dispute to arbitration.

Waetzig lost in arbitration.

Instead of filing a new complaint under the Federal Arbitration Act, he moved to reopen his original case and vacate the arbitration award within that proceeding.  He argued that his voluntary dismissal had been a mistake, and the District Court agreed, holding that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice counted as a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b).

The Turn: The Court of Appeals Reverses

The Tenth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Rule 60(b) does not apply to voluntary dismissals because they are neither a “final judgment” nor an “order.”

The Supreme Court granted review.

The Prestige: The Supreme Court Reversed in Favor of Waetzig on the Procedure Question.

The Supreme Court, reasoning from definitional, legislative intent, and other principles of statutory construction, outlined the following reasons why Waetzig’s argument was the correct one, procedurally:

1. Plain Meaning/Dictionaries: The plain meaning of “final” in Rule 60(b) aligns with legal dictionaries from 1946, when the term was first added. The Advisory Committee’s 1946 Notes confirm that Rule 60(b) was designed to exclude only interlocutory judgments, not voluntary dismissals. Id. at 8.
2. Inapposite Analogy to Federal Appellate Jurisdiction:  The Court rejected Halliburton’s argument that finality under Rule 60(b) should mirror finality under 28 U.S.C. §1291, which governs appellate jurisdiction. The Court explained that finality in the appellate context is distinct from finality in trial courts, as Rule 60(b) is discretionary and does not pose the same risk of disrupting litigation. Id. at 10.
3. Historical Precedent – Rule 60(b) was modeled after a California statute that explicitly allowed relief from voluntary dismissals without prejudice. Id. at 12–13 (citing Hall v. Hall, 584 U.S. 59, 72–73 (2018)).

The Court expressly declined to comment on the merits of Waetzig’s maneuver in remanding.

What This Means for Federal Court Defendants

This ruling does not mean that every, or even most, dismissals could (or would) be revived under Waetzig.  The Supreme Court made clear that “[w]hen the requirements of Rule 60(b) are satisfied, a district court may relieve a party from such a dismissal and reopen the case.” Id. at 14 (emphasis supplied).

As a result, counsel for all parties in federal court have a re-invigorated obligation to investigate whether any proposed dismissal under Rule 41(a) might be later argued to be the result of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”  This may, in turn, impact the amount federal court defendants are willing to pay in a particular circumstance, or perhaps require additional attestations upon dismissal to avoid a Waetzig situation.

What This Means for Federal Court Plaintiffs

Federal court plaintiffs are in receipt of a double-edged sword that cuts more favorably for them than against.  On the one hand, Waetzig stands for the proposition that a “careless mistake” in strategy can entitle one to relief under Rule 60(b).  See id. at 4 (“At that point, Waetzig could have asked the District Court to stay his federal lawsuit pending the arbitration proceedings.” [citations]).  As such, defendants may find themselves in the awkward position of helping their opponents navigate dismissals to avoid a revival under Rule 60(b).

The Closing Curtain
Waetzig serves as a reminder that procedure is more than just paperwork, and that not every hard-fought case that vanishes from the docket will stay gone. In the right circumstances, the case might just have one more appearing-act.

This summary is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended to constitute legal advice nor does it create an attorney-client relationship with Rimon, P.C. or its affiliates.

Robert Pepple is a Partner at Rimon Law, LLP, a California Freemason, and (most pointedly to this publication) a Magician Member of the Academy of Magic Arts in Hollywood, colloquially called the “Magic Castle.”  When he’s not doing magic tricks, he’s solving complex litigation problems for employers throughout the U.S., with an emphasis on California wage and hour law, arbitration jurisprudence, and regulatory compliance.